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WEIGHING THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
FACTOR IN CUSTODY CASES:
TIPPING THE SCALES IN FAVOR
OF PROTECTING VICTIMS
AND THEIR CHILDREN
Kim Susser*
INTRODUCTION
In 1996, the New York State Legislature ("the Legislature") at-
tempted to afford additional protection to domestic violence vic-
tims and their children involved in custody disputes by amending
New York's Domestic Relations Law ("DRL") and the Family
Court Act ("FCA") to mandate consideration of domestic violence
when determining the best interests of the child in custody and visi-
tation cases. Four years later, it is evident that the amendment
failed to change the behavior of the courts or overcome the en-
trenched attitudes of many judges, attorneys and forensic evalu-
ators regarding domestic violence.
The first Part of this Article contains a brief overview of the case
law since the passage of the 1996 amendment and considers how
courts applied the mandate to consider domestic violence as a fac-
tor in determining the best interests of the child. Part II addresses
practical issues that arise when litigating custody cases where do-
mestic violence is a factor. Part III uses three case studies to illus-
trate the failure of the amendment to create the necessary change
intended by the Legislature and the need for legislative reform im-
posing a presumption against awarding custody to abusive parents.
The final Part examines the inconsistency in the law between child
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Law Center, 1989. The author supervises the Domestic Violence Clinical Center at
the New York Legal Assistance Group and has practiced in the New York City family
courts since 1990 when she began as a trial attorney in the Juvenile Rights Division of
the Legal Aid Society. She is an active member of the Domestic Violence Task Force
of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York and the Lawyer's Committee
Against Domestic Violence. The author would like to thank Dorchen Leidholdt for
her continuing inspiration in this field, David Zlotnick for his introduction to
academia, Alison Sclater for her research assistance, Amy Barasch, Rhonda Panken
and Jill Wade for their red pens and, finally, her mother for her endless support for
whatever she chooses to do.
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protective cases and custody created by the amendment and policy
initiatives in the area of domestic violence and custody.
The statute states in pertinent part that where there are allega-
tions of domestic violence in any action for custody or visitation,
"and such allegations are proven by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, the court must consider the effect of such domestic violence
upon the best interests of the child, together with such other facts
and circumstances as the court deems relevant in making a direc-
tion pursuant to this section."1 Case law delineates additional fac-
tors to consider when applying the best interest standard.' The
best interest standard is elusive, however, and, as Justice Bernard
Meyer stated in Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer, "the only absolute
governing custody of children is that there are no absolutes."3
Prior to enactment of the legislation in 1996, some courts consid-
ered domestic violence in the allocation of custody and visitation
rights, although there were only four reported appellate cases in
New York before 1985. 4 Since then, domestic violence has been
considered increasingly relevant in making these determinations.5
Appellate courts, for example, have consistently held that domestic
violence witnessed by a child is a significant factor in determining
custody and visitation. 6 Courts have also considered acts of vio-
lence in determining a parent's fitness for custody.7 Domestic vio-
lence has also been considered a factor in relocation cases,8 was
1. Act of May 21, 1996, ch. 85, 1996 N.Y. LAWS 273, 275.
2. See Eschbach v. Eschbach, 436 N.E.2d 1260, 1264 (N.Y. 1982) (holding that,
although the mother was not an unfit parent, the court is free to view the totality of
the circumstances to determine the child's best interests); Friederwitzer v.
Friederwitzer, 432 N.E.2d 765, 768 (N.Y. 1982) ("The standard ultimately to be ap-
plied remains the best interests of the child when all of the applicable factors are
considered, not whether there exists one or more circumstances that can be denomi-
nated extraordinary."); Nehra v. Uhlar, 372 N.E.2d 4, 9 (N.Y. 1977) (holding that the
father should be granted custody because he was awarded custody at time of divorce,
he was a fit parent and the mother had obtained possession of the children by lawless
self-help).
3. 432 N.E.2d at 768.
4. See Marjory M. Fields, The Impact of Spouse Abuse on Children and Its Rele-
vance in Custody and Visitation Decisions in New York State, 3 CORNELL J. L. & PUB.
POL'Y 221, 242 (1994).
5. New York appellate courts have published 13 decisions holding that domestic
violence is relevant to the issues of custody and visitation between 1985 and 1994. See
id.
6. See LEE ELKINS & JANE FOSBINDER, NEW YORK LAW OF DOMESTIC VIO-
LENCE 591 (1998).
7. See Farkas v. Farkas, N.Y. L.J., July 13, 1992, at 31 (Sup. Ct. July 13, 1992);
Rohan v. Rohan, 623 N.Y.S.2d 390, 392 (App. Div. 1995).
8. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Mitchell, 619 N.Y.S.2d 182, 183 (App. Div. 1994); Olmo v.
Olmo, 528 N.Y.S.2d 880, 881 (App. Div. 1988).
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articulated as a basis to support supervised visitation9 and consti-
tuted "extraordinary circumstances" in cases where a non-biologi-
cal party was seeking custody.10 Courts also viewed violence
committed by a parent against a new partner as an important
concern.
11
In 1996, the Legislature determined that piecemeal decision
making was not a sufficient means toward justice and declared do-
mestic violence a factor that must be considered in determining the
best interests of a child.1 2 The most significant aspects of the
amendment are the specific findings regarding domestic violence
set forth by the Legislature:
The legislature finds and declares that there has been a growing
recognition across the country that domestic violence should be
a weighty consideration in custody and visitation cases.
The legislature recognizes the wealth of research demonstrat-
ing the effects of domestic violence upon children, even when
the children have not been physically abused themselves or wit-
nessed the violence. Studies indicate that children raised in a
violent home experience shock, fear, and guilt and suffer anxi-
ety, depression, low self-esteem, and developmental and sociali-
zation difficulties. Additionally, children raised by a violent
parent face increased risk of abuse. A high correlation has been
found between spouse abuse and child abuse.
Domestic violence does not terminate upon separation or di-
vorce. Studies demonstrate that domestic violence frequently
escalates and intensifies upon the separation of the parties.
Therefore,... great consideration should be given to the corro-
sive impact of domestic violence and the increased danger to the
family ......
These compelling findings enunciated by the Legislature call for
stronger language than that in the amended statute itself. The
amendment simply codifies domestic violence as a factor that must
9. See, e.g., Irwin v. Schmidt, 653 N.Y.S.2d 627, 629 (App. Div. 1997); Richard C.
v. Deborah A., N.Y. L.J., Nov. 27, 1995, at 36 (Fam. Ct. Nov. 27, 1995); Antoinette M.
v. Paul Seth G., 608 N.Y.S.2d 703, 704 (App. Div. 1994); Anonymous G. v. Anony-
mous G., 517 N.Y.S.2d 985, 987 (App. Div. 1987).
10. See, e.g., Peters v. Blue, N.Y. L.J., June 23, 1997, at 29 (Fam. Ct. June 23, 1997);
Pratt v. Wood, 620 N.Y.S.2d 551, 552 (App. Div. 1994).
11. See TI v. PS, N.Y. L.J., June 5, 1995, at 31 (Fain. Ct. June 5, 1995); Kaplan v.
Chamberlain, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 17, 1993, at 27 (Fain. Ct. Sept. 27, 1993).
12. See Act of May 21, 1996, ch. 85, 1996 N.Y. LAws 273, 273.
13. Id. at 273-74 (emphasis added).
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be considered when determining the best interests of the child.
The findings call for a rebuttable presumption against the award of
custody to a parent found to have committed domestic violence.
As many as eighteen states have adopted such a presumption.14
Although the Legislature explicitly rejected a presumption, the
new law is clearly meant to impose restrictions on visitation and
custody for one parent who has been found to have committed vio-
lence against the other parent. The legislative history plainly states
domestic violence "should be a weighty consideration."15 Domestic
violence is the only factor specifically codified, thereby implying
that courts minimizing or disregarding evidence of domestic vio-
lence are in derogation of the law.16 The problem lies in the reality
that mandating judges to give a particular factor "weighty consider-
ation" does not give much guidance. The statute has no teeth.
Although the statute's plain language states "domestic violence"
is a factor,17 it does not limit domestic violence to the definition of
a "family offense" as determined by Article Eight of the FCA.1 8
This is not an intentional omission on the part of the Legislature, as
the statute later specifically refers to Article Eight when defining
"family or household member."' 9 The Legislative findings also
14. Lynne R. Kurtz, Protecting New York's Children: An Argument for the Crea-
tion of a Rebuttable Presumption Against Awarding a Spouse Abuser Custody of a
Child, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1345, 1350 (1997); see also Katherine M. Reihing, Protecting
Victims of Domestic Violence and Their Children After Divorce: The American Law
Institute's Model, 37 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 393, 395 (1999). See also, e.g.,
ALA. CODE 1975 § 30-3-131 (Supp. 1999); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-403 (West
Supp. 1999); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-101(c) (Michie 1997); CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14-10-124 (1.5) (1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 705A (Supp. 1998); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 61.13(2)(b)(2) (West Supp. 1999); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571-46(9) (Michie
Supp. 1998); IDAHO CODE § 32-717B(5) (1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:364 (West
Supp. 1999); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17(2)(d) (West Supp. 1999); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 125.480(5) (1998); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:1.7 (1993); N.M. CENT. CODE § 14-09-
06.2(1)6) (1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 21.1(D) (West 1995); TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 153.004 (West 1996); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.191 (2)(a)(iii) (West
1997); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.24(2)(b)(2)(c) (West 1993); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-
113(a) (1999).
15. Act of May 21, 1996, ch. 85, 1996 N.Y. LAws 273, 273 (emphasis added).
16. See Ilana Gruebel, The Domestic Violence Factor in Child Custody and Visita-
tion Determinations, in LAWYER'S MANUAL ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: REPRESENT-
ING THE VIc-rM 171, 174 (Ronald E. Cohen et al. eds., 2d ed. 1998).
17. See Act of May 21, 1996, ch. 85, 1996 N.Y. LAws 273, 273-74.
18. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 812 (McKinney 1999). Section 812 of the New York
Family Court Act defines a family offense as "disorderly conduct, harassment [,] ag-
gravated harassment[,] menacing[,] reckless endangerment, assault . . . or an at-
tempted assault," as delineated by the relevant New York Penal Law provisions. Id.
(amended effective Dec. 1, 1999 to include "stalking" as a family offense).
19. See Act of May 21, 1996, ch. 85, 1996 N.Y. LAws 273, 275.
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specifically refer to "physical or psychological violence. ' 20 As dis-
cussed later,2 1 one Westchester Family Court case adopted an ex-
panded definition of domestic violence, which includes more than
physical acts. Therefore, the definition of domestic violence as it is
applied in custody cases is broader than the definition of domestic
violence applied in family offense cases. 22
Oddly, the statute limits the consideration of domestic violence
to acts committed against a "family or household member," as de-
fined in Article Eight of the FCA.23 Article Eight limits the defini-
tion of family or household member to a spouse, former spouse,
those who have a child in common, or any relative, whether by
blood or marriage. 4 This definition, however, omits paramours,
even if they live with one of the parties. Although there is nothing
to prevent a court from considering violence in such a context,25
this limitation appears to be a significant oversight by the
Legislature.
In 1998, the custody and visitation provisions of the DRL and
FCA were further amended to prohibit courts from granting cus-
tody or visitation to any person convicted of murdering the child's
parent.26 Under this statute, the court is not even permitted to or-
der temporary visitation pending the determination of a petition of
custody or visitation.27 Exceptions include situations where a child
of suitable age and maturity consents to such an order and where
the person convicted of the murder can prove that it was causally
related to self-defense against acts of domestic violence perpe-
trated by the deceased.28 By requiring the court to deny visitation
between parent and child, as a matter of law, the statute constitutes
"a dramatic change in the law."'2 9 In cases of murder, the Legisla-
ture willingly imposed a presumption against an award of cus-
tody,30 but specifically rejected such a presumption in other
20. Id. at 274.
21. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
22. See J.D. v. N.D., 652 N.Y.S.2d 468 (Fam. Ct. 1996).
23. N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 827(vii).
24. See id. § 812.
25. See ELKINS & FOSBINDER, supra note 6, at 595.
26. See Act of July 27, 1999, ch. 378, 1999 N.Y. LAws 1231, 1231-33.
27. See id. at 1232.
28. See id.
29. See ELKINS & FOSBINDER, supra note 6, at 67 (Supp. Mar., 1999) (citing John
R. v. Marlene C., N.Y. L.J., Dec. 8, 1998, at 28 (Fam. Ct. Dec. 8, 1998)).
30. See Act of July 27, 1999, ch. 378, 1999 N.Y. LAws.
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domestic violence custody cases.3 This disparity is analogous to
the criminal justice system's swift response to a domestic violence
homicide, as opposed to its frequently cavalier treatment of domes-
tic violence misdemeanors that, if treated with the same import,
might serve to prevent a domestic violence homicide.
I. POST-AMENDMENT CASES
Much of the case law since the passage of the amendment fails to
address the ultimate issue: How should courts apply the statutory
mandate to give domestic violence the "weighty consideration" re-
quired by the FCA.32 With the exception of two lower court cases
in Westchester County,33 there has been little analysis of the statute
or guidance as to the meaning of weighty consideration. One of
those cases indicated that domestic violence under the statute is
not limited to acts causing physical injury.34 The court held that
there was an "unmistakable pattern of power and control," and
that "[e]conomic, verbal and sexual abuse, coupled with regular
and frequent threats and intimidation, while more subtle in nature,
are no less damaging than a physical blow. 35
The other case held against the recommendations of the court-
appointed expert and the law guardian 36 to find that, although
neither parent presented an ideal environment, custody should re-
main with the mother.37 In that case, domestic violence was given
the "weighty consideration" envisioned by the Legislature 38 over
other factors presented by the facts of the case, including the ex-
pert's opinion that the mother was "evasive, anxious and histri-
onic."' 39 This decision also holds that, when experts do not give
sufficient weight to evidence of domestic violence, the court is free
31. See Act of May 21, 1996, ch. 85, 1996 N.Y. LAWS 273, 273-74 ("Rather than
imposing a presumption, the legislature hereby establishes domestic violence as a fac-
tor ... ").
32. Id. at 273.
33. See E.R. v. G.S.R., 648 N.Y.S.2d 257 (Fam. Ct. 1996); J.D. v. N.D., 652
N.Y.S.2d 468 (Fam. Ct. 1996).
34. See J.D., 652 N.Y.S.2d at 468 ("[Dlomestic violence is not limited to overt acts
of violence which cause physical injury. The Legislature implicitly recognized that
domestic violence is not a static concept . . .
35. Id. at 471.
36. A law guardian is defined as "an attorney who is assigned by a court to repre-
sent a child." NEW YORK STATE BAR Assoc., REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE
LAW GUARDIAN SYSTEM: THE PRIVATELY PAID LAW GUARDIAN 1 (1997).
37. See E.R., 648 N.Y.S.2d at 261.
38. See Act of May 21, 1996, ch. 85, 1996 N.Y. LAWS 273, 273.
39. See E.R., 648 N.Y.S.2d at 261.
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to disregard their opinions provided it has convincing reasons to do
SO.
40
In an unreported decision in New York County, the court cited
uncontroverted evidence of domestic violence as well as the fa-
ther's failure to understand its damaging impact on the children in
its award of custody to the mother.41 The court considered its leg-
islative mandate, stating that "the stench of domestic violence per-
meated the trial," and credited testimony that the mother's
relocation was out of her "desperate need to escape a violent rela-
tionship. ' 42 Although no allegations of domestic violence were
specifically pled, as required by the statute, the court conformed
the pleadings to the proof evinced at trial.43
In other cases that consider domestic violence, there was no ex-
amination of the legislative charge, but domestic violence was in-
stead considered regardless of the legislative mandate. One judge
recited a litany of factors that must be considered in determining a
relocation case, yet never mentioned the amendment. 44 In an ap-
pellate case, the court relied on two pre-amendment cases, instead
of the statute, and held that the father was "ill-suited to provide
moral and intellectual guidance" to his children due to his acts of
violence against their mother.45 A third court cited a law review
article, instead of the legislative findings in the amendment, to con-
clude that "young children exposed to domestic violence suffer a
broad range of developmental and socialization difficulties. '46
As a practical point, it matters little whether courts rely on the
statute itself or other material, rather, these decisions illustrate that
even those judges inclined to give domestic violence the weighty
consideration required, overlook the amendment because the lan-
guage is not strong enough to warrant deliberation. The amend-
ment was not needed for judges who appropriately exercise
discretion in their contemplation of domestic violence, it was
meant for those who do not. For judges who do not evaluate do-
mestic violence, the mandate to consider it as a factor is insuffi-
40. See id.
41. See Anthony S. v. Kimberly S., Nos. V-1276-97, V-1747-97, V-1277.97, V-1278-
97, 1998 WL 425464, at *4 (Fam. Ct. June 19, 1998).
42. Id. at *6.
43. See id.
44. See In re Juan C., N.Y. L.J., Oct. 12, 1999, at 29 (Fam. Ct. Oct. 12, 1999).
45. See Irvin v. Schmidt, 653 N.Y.S.2d 627, 629 (App. Div. 1997). See also In re
Dejesus, 1999 WL 1215165 (N.Y. App. Div. Nov. 1, 1999).
46. Christopher S. v. Ann Marie S., 662 N.Y.S.2d 200, 206 (Fam. Ct. 1997) (citing
M.M. Pagelow, The Effects of Domestic Violence on Children and Their Consequences
for Custody and Visitation Agreements, MEDIATION Q., Summer 1990, at 346).
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cient. The language of weighty consideration leaves too much
discretion to an individual judge or expert. For example, the Ap-
pellate Division affirmed an award of custody to a father who ad-
mitted to being the subject of an order of protection and was
ordered to complete a batterer's program.47 One dissenting justice
argued that the lower court erred as the record was "replete with
domestic violence. ' 48 The dissent further contended that the lower
court failed to "admit and adequately consider evidence relevant to
serious incidents of domestic violence that bear on the father's fit-
ness for custody. 49
In a matrimonial proceeding, another court held that several or-
ders of protection issued on behalf of a mother were not sufficient
evidence warranting consideration of the impact of domestic vio-
lence on her children.50 It was not clear whether the orders of pro-
tection the judge was referring to were issued after a hearing or on
consent. The striking point in this case was that there was a trial on
the grounds for divorce and sufficient evidence was found to grant
the mother a judgement based on cruel and inhuman treatment of
her by the father which the court failed to consider in determining
the best interests of the children. The underlying facts comprising
the cruel and inhuman treatment were not set forth in the decision.
Some might posit that domestic violence is sufficiently addressed
in a line of joint custody cases, which predate the amendment.
Although case law clearly dictates that joint custody is not con-
doned in situations where domestic violence is found, the routes of
analysis differ."t In joint custody cases, courts reason that parents
who are "severely antagonistic and embattled" should not be
awarded joint custody since joint custody by definition requires
joint decision-making.52 The rationale underlying the amendment
to Section 240 of the DRL is based on the wealth of research dem-
onstrating the harm to children exposed to violence, rather than
the inability of parents to cooperate.
47. See Smith v. Purnell, 682 N.Y.S.2d 889, 890 (App. Div. 1998).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See Walsh v. Walsh, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 21, 1998, at 32 (Sup. Ct. Sept. 21, 1998).
51. See supra notes 34-50 and accompanying text.
52. Braiman v. Braiman, 378 N.E.2d 1019, 1019 (N.Y. 1978); see also Spencer v.
Small, 693 N.Y.S. 727, 729 (App. Div. 1999) ("Clearly, there could not be an award of
joint custody due to the violent relationship between these parties and respondent's
lack of any positive effort to control his anger." (citation omitted)).
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II. PRACTICE ISSUES
Incidents of domestic violence must be proven by a preponder-
ance of the evidence in order to be considered as a factor under the
statute.5 3 Findings of prior family offenses in family court and crim-
inal convictions should therefore be given a res judicata effect in a
custody or visitation proceeding.54 If there has been no prior find-
ing or conviction, then the violence can be proven anew during the
course of the custody trial.55 Litigators ought to be wary of cases
where the family offense is tried before a judge in family court, but
the custody/visitation case is then referred to a Court Attorney
Referee56 who must consider,-but has not actually heard, the testi-
mony regarding domestic violence. 7 Although it is often less com-
plicated for an attorney to prove the violence in a separate family
offense proceeding and then use the finding as a tool for negotiat-
ing a settlement in the custody/visitation matter, if a settlement on
the custody/visitation is not reached, the court hearing that case
will not have heard the testimony about the domestic violence. In
these situations, one can argue that, notwithstanding the res judi-
cata effect, the trial court ought to hear the live testimony and have
the opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses.
The statute and legislative history also provide material for cross
examining expert witnesses who either minimize or disregard do-
mestic violence in their custody/visitation recommendations. The
American Psychological Association ("APA"), for example, has
found that false reporting of family violence occurs infrequently
53. See id. at 275.
54. See Tiffany A. v. Margaret J., 656 N.Y.S.2d 792, 795-96 (Fam. Ct. 1996) (hold-
ing that three prior determinations of parental unfitness serve as "res judicata on the
question of [the mother's] fitness to parent, her right to custody and what is in the
best interests of [the] children"). But cf. Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer, 432 N.E.2d
765, 767 (N.Y. 1982) (indicating that on petition for change of custody "that no one
factor, including the existence of [an] earlier decree or agreement, is determinative of
whether there should, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, be a change of
custody").
55. See, e.g, Hollister v. Hollister, 678 N.Y.S.2d 820 (App. Div. 1998) (upholding
lower court's determination that respondent did not substantiate domestic violence
accusations by a preponderance of the evidence).
56. See N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 439 (McKinney 1999).
57. It is common practice for the New York City family courts to appoint Refer-
ees, who are lawyers, not judges, to hear custody and visitation cases. This is due to
the shortage of judges in the New York City family court system. See Catherine J.
Ross, Unified Family Courts: Good Sense, Good Justice, TRIAL, Jan. 1, 1999 at 30, 31
("In New York City ... there are only 41 sitting judges. These judges handle over
225,000 cases a year, or approximately 5500 cases annually for each judge. A system
like this one cannot be expected to yield anything more than 'assembly-line
justice.'").
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and that the rate of false reports in custody cases is no greater than
for other crimes.58 Despite this, studies show that mental health
professionals still believe that "as many as one in eight women are
magnifying violence as a ploy in custody disputes. 59 Judges should
not give weight to expert opinions where the expert has not shown
an understanding of the psycho-social literature addressing the
negative impact of domestic violence on children as set forth in the
legislative history of the 1996 amendment.
It is imperative to introduce a copy of the legislative history to
the court in your summation when litigating custody cases where
domestic violence is an issue so that the court can better under-
stand the rationale behind the amendment and accord it the proper
weight. The legislative findings can be annexed to motions and ref-
erenced during the course of a trial. As will be seen below, how-
ever, good practice is not always enough to overcome the long-
standing behaviors and attitudes impacting on these cases.
60
III. CASE STUDIES
6 1
Many cases regarding custody and visitation emanate from the
family court, a court in which most litigants appear pro se or with
court-appointed counsel.62 Written opinions are not issued in most
cases, and many are not appealed. Therefore, it is important to
examine how cases are decided from a practitioner's point of view.
Case studies reveal a more detailed picture of the lower court pro-
ceedings than those usually reflected in appellate opinions. I began
practicing in this area in 1994, the year before this legislation
passed. Using three cases, each in different boroughs of New York
City and each post-dating the amendment, I will show the necessity
for the imposition of a presumption against awarding custody to
58. See AMERICAN PSYCHOL. Assoc., VIOLENCE AND THE FAMILY 12 (1996).
59. Joan Zorza, Protecting the Children in Custody: Disputes When One Parent
Abuses the Other, 29 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1113, 1120 (1996) (citing PETER G.
JAFFE, CHILDREN OF BATTERED WOMEN 32-75 (1995)).
60. See discussion infra Part III.
61. Each case study is based upon a family court case in which the author
represented the battered mother. Names, locations and key facts have been changed
to protect the confidentiality of the parties. Written decisions and transcripts are on
file with the author.
62. See, e.g., Russell Engler, And Justice for All - Including the Unrepresented
Poor: Revisiting the Roles of the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV.
1987, 2047 (1999) ("The numbers of unrepresented litigants in family law cases have
surged nationwide, with some reports indicating that eighty percent or more of family
law cases involve at least one pro se litigant.").
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abusive parents.63 The mandate to give domestic violence a
weighty consideration was ineffective in each of the cases.
In each case, a family offense petition was filed by the mother
requesting an order of protection. In two of the cases, the custody
or visitation trial proceeded contemporaneously with the family of-
fense trial, and in the other the custody case immediately followed
the family offense trial.
A. Mr. S. v. Ms. B.
The first case is a Bronx County matter in which, during a partic-
ularly vicious assault, the respondent pulled a clump of hair out of
Ms. B.'s head. The parties were never married and never lived to-
gether, but had one child in common. There was a lengthy trial on
the family offense case before a judge who later referred the cus-
tody case to a referee. The referee assigned a law guardian who
appeared on the custody/visitation matter.
Ms. B. initiated the family offense proceeding, seeking an order
of protection. Her petition alleged several incidents of domestic
violence during which the child's father seriously assaulted her. A
few months after she filed her family offense petition, Mr. S. filed
petitions for paternity and custody. He never filed a family offense
petition against Ms. B.
The judge first heard testimony on the family offense case. Ms.
B. testified on her own behalf to an incident that took place in the
respondent's mother's home. His mother often cared for the baby
while Ms. B. was working and attending nursing school. When Ms.
B. picked up the child one afternoon, Mr. S. appeared and they
began arguing about child support. Mr. S. started cursing and
pushed Ms. B. onto the couch while she held the baby. He choked
her and pulled her hair with such ferocity that she was left with a
two to three inch bald spot on her head. Ms. B. introduced medical
records and photographs of the injuries to her head and neck. The
medical records, including x-rays and a CAT scan, indicated a con-
cussion, memory loss, muscle spasm, back pain, dizziness and hair
loss. Mr. S. was left with scratches on his face from Ms. B.'s at-
tempts to break free when he was choking her. Both parties were
arrested for the incident. The criminal case against the mother was
dismissed by the District Attorney's office and the criminal case
against the father proceeded to a jury trial. He was acquitted on all
charges.
63. See discussion infra Parts III.A-C.
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In addition to testifying for himself, Mr. S.'s brother, sister and
current girlfriend testified on his behalf, as did the arresting police
officer, Mr. S.'s roommate and his psychologist. Mr. S. denied any
violence on his part and maintained that the incident at his
mother's home was initiated by the petitioner who had scratched
his face. He also testified that on another occasion the petitioner
threw a chair at him.
Although there were no allegations pending against Ms. B., Mr.
S.'s roommate was permitted to testify, over objection, as to
whether he had ever seen Ms. B. attack Mr. S. The issue arose
again during Mr. S.'s testimony when he was asked about threaten-
ing messages left by Ms. B. on his answering machine. The respon-
dent's testimony concerned alleged threats to take him to court for
his failure to pay child support, which, even if true, do not consti-
tute a criminal act nor address the issues of the case. During his
defense, Mr. S. and his brother, who admitted to abusing heroin
during the time period about which he was testifying, stated that on
a different occasion, Ms. B. once threw a chair at Mr. S. Though
apparently offered as an excuse for Mr. S.'s assaults upon Ms. B.,
the court effectively imputed a counter-claim against Ms. B., which
the court later concluded was proven.
Had the allegations against Ms. B. been properly raised, she
would have been served with a petition at least five days prior to
the hearing and been given the same opportunity to defend herself
as Mr. S. had to defend himself.64 Armed with notice of the
charges that the court considered against her, Ms. B. could have
defended herself against the accusations by requesting pretrial dis-
closure, calling witnesses or introducing other evidence on her own
behalf. Instead, she unwittingly relied on her strong documentary
evidence in pursuit of an order of protection. Although she offered
rebuttal witnesses to counter Mr. S.'s undocumented allegations,
rebuttal testimony was not permitted.
At the conclusion of the family offense trial, the judge found that
Mr. S. committed assault in the third degree, a family offense. He
further found that Mr. S. had caused physical injury and that,
therefore, aggravating circumstances existed. The judge issued a
three year order of protection on behalf of Ms. B., the longest du-
64. Whether family offense charges are raised in a petition or as counter-claims,
the person charged has a constitutionally based right to the notice necessary to pres-
ent a defense. The FCA sets forth specific procedures for counter-claims which in-
clude service of a petition no later than five days prior to the return date. See N.Y.
FAM. CT. Acr § 154(b) (McKinney 1999).
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ration permissible under Article 8 of the FCA.65 Although the
court found aggravating circumstances and issued an order of pro-
tection, the judge went on to state in his oral findings of fact that
the violence was "mutual." Specifically, the court made the follow-
ing findings:
1. I find it credible and that on the occasion in her - in his
apartment.., that Ms. B. did throw the chair, I find that she has
acted [at] times in ways that were extremely inappropriate and
- risky to the child.
2. I find that on occasion, Mr. S. also acted inappropriately in
the presence of the child, and that both parents have contrib-
uted to the atmosphere of that, [sic] I think, have probably cre-
ated impairment to the child.
3. I find in this case that the domestic violence was not unilat-
eral, it was bilateral....
4. The court also finds both parents are involved in a violent
and unhealthy relationship and each parent is equally responsi-
ble for exposing the child to domestic violence.
Following an objection to the findings of fact because there was no
petition against Ms. B., the judge responded, "I can tell you that
there's [sic] been a petition filed against your client. There is a
very strong likelihood [that] mutual orders would have been con-
sidered, that is not before me, that is [moot]."
Time and again the court acknowledged that no allegations were
pending against Ms. B. Nevertheless, the judge stated that if he
could have, he would have issued a mutual order of protection.
Luckily for Ms. B., the issuance of mutual orders of protection,
without the filing of a petition, are illegal pursuant to section 841 of
the FCA.66 Mutual orders of protection are "yet another weapon"
by which a batterer threatens and subdues his or her victim. 67 They
send the message to the batterer that he is not responsible for his
violent acts - she is. It was this message that led to legislation
outlawing mutual orders of protection under these very circum-
stances. Nonetheless, this was the message that the court sent to
Mr. S.
The impact of the decision was practically the same as if a mu-
tual order of protection had been issued. The father and the law
guardian attempted to use these findings against Ms. B. during the
custody/visitation proceedings subsequently heard by a referee.
65. See id. § 842.
66. See id. § 841.
67. See OCA Report Supporting S-4025B, at 2 (N.Y. 1995).
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Most importantly, the unauthorized findings made it impossible to
use the legitimate finding against the father effectively, in the way
that the Legislature intended. How could the referee give the do-
mestic violence the weighty consideration mandated when the pro-
ceeding was clouded by the erroneous findings against Ms. B. from
the family offense case?
Ms. B. appealed the findings. She argued that, although no or-
der of protection was issued against her, she was harmed by the
findings in the subsequent custody case. She argued that since she
did not receive the notice of any cross-claims to which she was enti-
tled, the findings must be stricken. Left standing, the findings
could be used against her in any subsequent modification of cus-
tody or visitation proceeding.
The Appellate Division held that "in the absence of a written
cross-petition by respondent as required by the FCA to provide
petitioner-appellant with notice of her alleged responsibility for in-
cidents of domestic violence the findings of the trial court on that
issue were gratuitous and unauthorized and can be of no dispositive
effect in any other litigation between the parties."68 The Appellate
Division further held that the denial of the petitioner's rebuttal
witnesses was improper.69
The custody and visitation case had already settled by the time
the Appellate Division issued a decision. The mother obtained full
custody and the father was granted visitation on alternate week-
ends from Saturday until Sunday, and one evening a week. The
exchange of the child was to take place at a police precinct.
Of course, at the custody trial, the mother could have tried to re-
litigate the domestic violence instead of settling, but there was a
clear coercive effect that the unauthorized findings had on settle-
ment negotiations. More importantly, if there were a trial, what
weight could the referee really give to a finding against the respon-
dent clouded by "unauthorized and gratuitous" findings about the
petitioner? 70 The referee was prevented from giving weighty con-
sideration to the findings against the respondent because there
were findings against both parties. If there were a presumption
imposed then the referee would have had no choice but to shift the
68. Lorin B. v. Michael S., 679 N.Y.S.2d 11, 11 (App. Div. 1998) (emphasis
added).
69. See id.
70. Id.
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burden to the respondent to rebut the presumption. 71 A presump-
tion statute would address circumstances where each party accuses
the other of violence and requires courts to determine who is the
primary aggressor. Additionally, the mother had already testified
at two trials by that time, one in criminal court and one in family
court: how many times should she have to relive the violence?
The father was later arrested for violating the family court order
of protection by going to the child's school and attempting to visit
him. A jury convicted him of criminal contempt. The criminal
court granted Mr. S. a conditional discharge and a three-year order
of protection was issued on behalf of Ms. B. and the child, except
during court ordered visitation. 72 According to the Assistant Dis-
trict Attorney ("ADA") who prosecuted the case, the judge ad-
monished the defendant not to "breathe or mutter" in Ms. B.'s
direction, but denied the ADA's request for a split sentence of jail
and probation.
Had the findings of fact on the family offense been limited to the
mother's case, as the Appellate Division held they should have,73 it
is likely there would have been stricter limits placed on visitation.
The father would have been held completely accountable for his
behavior instead of getting the clear message that the mother was
partially responsible.
B. J.v.J.
In this Queens County matter, there had been a severe and
lengthy history of violence against the mother. She had filed sev-
eral family offense petitions in Queens County Family Court in the
past, all of which resulted in the respondent either consenting to
the issuance of an order of protection without any admission of
wrongdoing, or in a default judgement being issued against him.
The family offense and custody cases were tried concurrently. The
cases were before the judge for almost three years before they
were resolved. The mother had previously agreed to allowing the
father to have custody of the two children because she believed
that if he had custody then he would stop abusing and continually
stalking her. About one year after consenting to his having cus-
71. In some states the presumption may be rebutted by showing that he had com-
pleted a batterer's intervention program or extraordinary circumstances evidencing
there is no risk of continuing violence. See Kurtz, supra note 14, at 1350.
72. The mother also filed a violation petition in the family court which was later
withdrawn.
73. Lorin B., 679 N.Y.S.2d at 11.
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tody, the children complained to her that their father was con-
stantly yelling at them, treating them like "slaves" by forcing them
to perform excessive chores in the household, and that he had hit
one of them. Upon hearing her children's stories, the mother filed
to modify the custody arrangement.
The allegations in the family offense case were that the respon-
dent threatened her that "you better run for your life" and that he
would "rather see the children in foster care" than with her. Her
petition further alleged an incident occurring around Christmas of
1995, during which time he had choked her with a scarf in front of
the children. The mother testified to years of violence, including
the incidents contained in her previous family offense petitions.
Two specific incidents to which she testified were that the father
had hit her in the face with a two-by-four piece of wood, and that
on a different occasion he had broken her ribs. Both of these as-
saults occurred years before the trial. It was these two most serious
incidents that the judge,-the law guardian and the court-appointed
forensics expert found the least credible.
Mrs. J. was forced to move on several occasions because her hus-
band constantly followed her, attempted to force his way into her
apartment, and yelled and cursed at her outside her window. Each
time she moved she kept her address confidential but the respon-
dent always managed to find her.
During his interview with the probation officer ("P.O.") who was
conducting the investigation and report that was ordered, the re-
spondent admitted that indeed he had followed Mrs. J., and ap-
peared at her apartment at 4:00 a.m. during the time the parties
were separated. The respondent initially lied to the P.O. and de-
nied following Mrs. J., stating, "I never follow her, she is not telling
the truth." Upon further questioning by the P.O. as to how the
respondent knew where Mrs. J. was living, "he smiled at the P.O.
and stated, 'I followed her, I know everything about her."' Despite
evidence to the contrary, the respondent later denied in his testi-
mony that he ever told the P.O. that he had followed Mrs. J., or
that he found her at her apartment at 4:00 a.m., further undermin-
ing his credibility.
Four experts testified at the trial. The first was a school guidance
counselor, a qualified social worker, with whom the children dis-
cussed witnessing specific incidents of their father's abuse against
their mother. The second was the court appointed psychologist
who found the mother "hysterical" in her rendering of the domes-
tic violence. He met with the children for twenty minutes each,
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and recommended that custody be awarded to the father. The
third expert was a psychologist retained by the mother with court
ordered funds, but who was only permitted to evaluate the mother
and children. The father refused to be seen by her as she was the
mother's witness. She recommended that custody be awarded to
the mother and supervised visitation granted to the father. The last
expert was the children's social worker from a private agency
where the family had been referred after reports were made
against the father to the Administration for Children's Services
("ACS"). Her testimony was primarily factual in nature regarding
statements made by the father and children in counseling, and the
children's psychological diagnosis of depression and anxiety. She
had not seen the mother in counseling.
A certificate of conviction against the father for harassment of
his current girlfriend in Connecticut was introduced into evidence.
The underlying facts of that incident could not be established, but
the father admitted that he and his girlfriend indeed had a fight,
and that the incident occurred in front of the children. In addition,
as a result of several reports to the ACS regarding the children, the
father attended individual counseling for several months. These
reports were also admitted into evidence. The father admitted to
hitting one of the children with a belt. After determining that an
"Alternatives to Violence" program was necessary, the caseworker
referred the father to such a program. The father never attended,
and the caseworker never followed up.
The law guardian had represented the children during the earlier
proceedings and resumed his representation on the current case.
Although he supported granting custody to the mother, the law
guardian did not believe that the domestic violence had occurred.
In his written summation, he stated that the mother's history of
domestic violence was "troubling in that its details traveled beyond
the realm of credibility." Although his position throughout the
trial was that his clients wished to live with their mother, he never
conducted his questioning of the parties in a manner that would
have supported the children's position, nor did he present any evi-
dence to that effect. The children were six and seven years old at
the commencement of the case. The bases for his supporting that
custody be granted to the mother were his clients' wishes and, that
although the children maintained a stable residence and did well in
school while living with their father, their daily routine was "lit-
tered with verbal disputes, yelling, displays of anger from the fa-
ther which are intimidating and sometimes frightening to them and
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sometimes result in hitting, yanking of arms, and physical pushing
and restraining." The law guardian repeatedly noted his grave con-
cern that the mother would be unable to prevent her negative feel-
ings about Mr. J. from interfering with the children's relationship
with their father.
At one point during the trial, the judge stated specifically that no
statutory mandate to consider domestic violence was necessary be-
cause case law already required the court to do so. Ultimately
though, the court held that "none of the major parties.were credi-
ble." In particular, the court found the mother "grandiose and his-
trionic," and her testimony, with respect to the history of violence,
incredible. The court characterized the father as a "nominalist"
with "poor impulse control."74
In a somewhat inconsistent written opinion, the judge dismissed
the family offense case, holding that the petitioner did not prove
the allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. He then
granted custody to the mother and issued an order of protection on
behalf of her and the children under the custody docket. Although
the court did not believe that the father physically abused and
stalked the mother, it found that he did verbally abuse her, issuing
the order of protection on that basis. The court relied heavily on
its two in camera interviews with the children. The court further
noted that the children presented conflicting statements depending
on whom they were speaking to and when. The court did not give
weight to one child's report of domestic violence because he could
not discern whether it was her actual experience, or whether she
heard about it and incorporated it into her belief system. Custody
was awarded to the mother because she provided emotional stabil-
ity for the children and because the father was found to have used
excessive corporal punishment on one of the children.
The court gave no indication in its written decision of how much
weight, if any, was given to the harassment conviction against the
father in which his current paramour was the complainant. This
incident alone could have provided the basis for a change in cus-
74. It is unclear why the court referred to the respondent as a "nominalist." The
dictionary defines "nominalism" as "[t]he doctrine that abstract concepts, general
terms, or universals have no objective reference but exist only as names." THE AMER-
ICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 845 (2d College ed. 1991) (emphasis added). The
court's statement may allude to the respondent being a father in name only. In the
context of the decision, however, it seems that the judge may have instead meant
"minimalist," referring to the respondent's attempts to minimize the allegations of
domestic violence and corporal punishment.
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tody.75 Domestic violence against a partner who is not the other
parent must be considered in a best interest determination.76
Ironically, the court granted Mrs. J. more relief than she would
have if the order of protection had been awarded on the family
offense case. Protective orders issued pursuant to a custody action,
as this one was, are in effect until the youngest child turns eighteen
years of age. 77 Had the order been issued under Article 8 of the
FCA, the maximum duration could only have been three years.78
A legal presumption alone would not have changed the outcome
of this case because the court simply did not believe the mother's
testimony about the violence. Nonetheless, had the court applied
the legislative findings, then it might have found Mrs. J.'s rendering
of the violence more plausible. For example, the timing of the inci-
dents she relayed was consistent with the fact that violence gener-
ally escalates upon separation. Also, the statements from the
children as to the father's verbal abuse and corporal punishment
are consistent with the finding that there is a high correlation be-
tween spousal and child abuse.79 The testimony of her guidance
counselor revealed that one of the children was exhibiting suicidal
ideation. According to the mother's expert and the children's own
social worker, both children were exhibiting signs of depression
and anxiety. These symptoms can all arise from long-term expo-
sure to domestic violence.80 The mother's relinquishment of cus-
tody to the father in an attempt to avoid further violence is also
consistent with typical domestic violence cases.81 Much of the evi-
dence brought before the court was consistent with the impact of
domestic violence. Viewed within the framework of the legislative
findings, together with the imposition of a presumption against
awarding custody to a batterer, this evidence would have com-
pelled the court to grant custody of the subject children to Mrs. J.
unless Mr. J. could rebut the presumption.
75. See Irwin v. Schmidt, 653 N.Y.S.2d 627, 628-29 (1997) ("Notably, evidence of
the father's acts of domestic violence against his current wife demonstrated that he
possesses a character which is ill-suited to the difficult task of providing his young
children with moral and intellectual guidance.").
76. See id.
77. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §240(3) (McKinney Supp. 1999).
78. See N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 828 (McKinney 1999).
79. See Act of May 21, 1996, ch. 85, 1996 N.Y. LAws 273, 274.
80. See id.
81. See Zorza, supra note 59, at 1124.
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Some of the facts of this case study parallel the Westchester case
discussed earlier.82 In that case, the expert also found the mother
"evasive, anxious and histrionic," and recommended an award of
custody to the father.83 That court, however, found that the
mother's frequent crying "was heartfelt, not histrionic," 84 and re-
jected the psychologist's recommendation in part based upon the
fact that he skimmed over instances of domestic violence. In this
case, the expert and the judge also found the mother "hysterical,"
but the court was unable to fit her behavior into a framework that
incorporates the dynamics of domestic abuse. Many battered wo-
men suffering post-traumatic stress disorder are mislabeled as
histrionic. 85
The court, the law guardian and the court-appointed expert all
raised typical questions regarding the mother's credibility about
the two most severe assaults. All three failed to understand how
her injuries healed without medical treatment and therefore con-
cluded she had lied or exaggerated. Although Mrs. J.'s cousin cor-
roborated the incident in which Mr. S. hit Mrs. J. with a two-by-
four, and Mrs. J. testified that she went to a private doctor for her
broken ribs, neither the court nor the law guardian believed she
could have possibly sustained such injuries and not sought treat-
ment.86 The law guardian further questioned why those two inci-
dents were not specifically alleged in the mother's earlier family
offense petitions. The fact that Mrs. J. had sought orders of protec-
tion and had drafted the earlier petitions without representation,
that Mr. J. had a later conviction against him for harassing his cur-
rent paramour and had admitted to stalking Mrs. J., and that the
children were complaining of verbal abuse and corporal punish-
ment did nothing to enhance her credibility with the court, the law
guardian or the expert. These factors were not viewed together in
the context of domestic abuse, instead they were perceived in a
disjointed manner. The legislative history sets forth many funda-
mental tenets of the dynamics and impact of domestic violence on
women and children. Courts should look to it for guidance in un-
82. See E.R. v. G.S.R., 648 N.Y.S.2d 257 (Fam. Ct. 1996); see also supra notes 34-
50 and accompanying text.
83. E.R., 648 N.Y.S.2d at 261.
84. Id.
85. See PETER G. JAFFE & R. GEFFNER, CHILDREN EXPOSED TO MARITAL VIO-
LENCE THEORY, RESEARCH, AND APPLIED IssuEs 379 (G.W. Holden et al. eds.,
1998).
86. The medical records were unavailable because the incident occurred almost six
years earlier and the doctor was no longer working at the same location.
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derstanding these dynamics, and apply the findings to the facts
before them.
The APA recognizes that a victim of domestic violence is likely
to be at a disadvantage in custody cases if the court does not con-
sider the history of violence since "behavior that would seem rea-
sonable as protection from abuse may be misinterpreted as signs of
instability. Psychological evaluators not trained in domestic vio-
lence may contribute to this process by ignoring or minimizing the
violence and by giving pathological labels to women's responses to
chronic victimization. ' 87 This heightened disbelief of battered wo-
men, coupled with misinterpretation of their behavior are two im-
portant reasons to impose a presumption against allowing a parent
who commits acts of domestic violence to have custody. Battered
women need help to overcome the image they sometimes present
in court or during psychological evaluations. A victim may re-en-
act her adaptations to living in a hostile environment when she is in
court, "becoming agitated, over-emotional or stupefied into si-
lence. Attorneys as well as judges often react negatively to such
behavior, particularly if the abusive partner appears calm, collected
and sure of himself. '88 This dynamic cries out for the scales of jus-
tice to be tipped in favor of protecting victims and their children,
for the imposition of a presumption, in order to compensate for
negative expert and judicial reactions.
Although awarded visitation on alternate weekends and holi-
days, Mr. J. moved to Florida shortly after losing custody and has
not seen his children since.
C. M.v.M.
The third case was tried in Kings County. Here, the father had
to be continually removed from the courtroom due to his out-
bursts. The visitation trial commenced shortly after the family of-
fense trial. The father was ineligible for appointed counsel and
appeared pro se on both cases. This case was also before the court
for almost three years before its resolution.89 The parties were
divorced.
87. AMERICAN PSYCHOL. Assoc., supra note 58, at 100.
88. Evan Stark, Building a Domestic Violence Case, in LAWYER'S MANUAL ON
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: REPRESENTING THE VICTIM (Anne M. Lopatto & James C.
Neely eds., 1st ed. 1995).
89. Generally, family offense cases in New York City do not take quite that long
to conclude. When the custody case is tried concurrently with the family offense case,
however, they take significantly longer.
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In this case, the judge made a finding of assault on the family
offense case, and found aggravating circumstances based on the
physical injury suffered by the mother. The court issued a three
year order of protection on behalf of the mother and child, except-
ing court-ordered visitation. The mother testified that the respon-
dent pushed and shoved her, kicked her, struck her in the face with
a closed fist and grabbed her throat. The couple's four-year-old
child witnessed this assault at the home of the child's babysitter.
The mother vividly described her daughter's reaction to witnessing
the assault, stating that the child was crying and screaming for her
father to stop. The mother testified that she had bruises on her
legs and her face was red and swollen. Although Mr. M. was ar-
rested for this assault, the criminal case was adjourned in contem-
plation of dismissal and an order of protection was issued for one
year. This is a common result for misdemeanor cases involving do-
mestic violence in criminal court.90
Mrs. M. also testified about incidents of domestic violence that
occurred early in the relationship. In 1992, while pregnant with the
subject child, the father threatened to burn Mrs. M. with an iron
she was using at the time. After the child was born, he threatened
to kill Mrs. M. and kicked at the apartment door while standing
outside the apartment. During this time period, he cursed at her
and called her a "whore" and a "bitch" in front of the children. 91
During his cross-examination of Mrs. M., the respondent called her
a "money-hungry dog" and a "lesbian."
The court took judicial notice that Mrs. M. had an order of pro-
tection in place almost every year since she first sought one in 1992.
These orders were issued either on consent or as a result of the
respondent's default.
The mother presented expert testimony by the child's social
worker who described the specific impact the domestic violence
had on the subject child, including nightmares and clingy, later ag-
gressive, behavior. The social worker, who specialized in domestic
violence, also testified to the negative effects that domestic vio-
lence has on children in general. She submitted reports to the
court almost every time the case was heard, urging the court to
direct Mr. M. to complete a batterer's intervention program.
90. In 1998, approximately 25% of the misdemeanor cases in Kings County were
adjourned in contemplation of dismissal and orders of protection were issued for one
year. See Office of Court Administration, Criminal Records Information Manage-
ment Systems.
91. The mother also had an older son who had a different father.
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A police officer testified to witnessing injuries, a bloody lip and
swollen eye, suffered by the father's current live-in paramour. The
officer testified that the girlfriend identified the respondent as the
perpetrator of her injuries and that the respondent was arrested in
the apartment they shared. The officer also testified that the re-
spondent tried to resist arrest by flailing his arms. The officer's
testimony was particularly relevant because Mr. M. testified as to
his relationship with this particular girlfriend. He stated that she
would act as a role model along with him, helping him impart his
family values to his daughter.
Evidence was also presented regarding issues other than domes-
tic violence. The father never lived with the child. When she was
born, he visited a few times a week for a short time, but always in
the presence of the mother or maternal grandmother. There was a
long period of time during which he did not see the child at all
because orders of protection were in place against him. He filed
for visitation twice, but both cases were dismissed when he failed
to appear.
In his closing argument, the law guardian supported a continued
order of supervised visitation, and highlighted to the court the fa-
ther's uncontrollable behavior in the courtroom. Although the law
guardian stated that his client wished to see her father in an un-
supervised setting and acknowledged that the supervised visitation
had continued without major incident, he cited two reasons for
making a recommendation contrary to his client's wishes. First, his
client's young age rendered her unable to appropriately consider
her own safety. Second, the numerous gifts her father bestowed on
her, even after the court had admonished him to cease this behav-
ior, had improperly influenced the child's thinking.
The court ordered unsupervised visitation for the father on alter-
nate Sundays from 10:00 a.m. until 5:00 p.m.
Mrs. M. appealed the visitation ruling, arguing that the family
court did not give the incidents of violence sufficient weight as re-
quired by the statute. Although the Appellate Division granted a
stay of the lower court ruling, ultimately the court affirmed the or-
der for unsupervised visitation, holding that Mrs. M. failed to show
any detrimental effect on the child.92 Apparently, the expert wit-
ness' testimony and the law guardian's recommendation were in-
sufficient. The Appellate Division's failure to hold that domestic
violence constitutes a detrimental effect is at odds with the legisla-
92. See Mackey v. Mackey, 696 N.Y.S.2d 695, 695 (App. Div. 1999).
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tive findings in the statute that clearly state that "a home environ-
ment of constant fear where physical or psychological violence is
the means of control ... must be contrary to the best interests of
the child." 93 The legislative findings also enumerate specific harms
to children resulting from domestic violence.94 This issue is ana-
lyzed further in the following discussion.
IV. DISCUSSION
The enactment of a legal presumption, in addition to the strong
legislative findings already in existence, would have changed the
outcome in all of the cases presented. It is particularly notable that
in the cases in the Bronx and in Brooklyn, the same judge who
determined there was violence in the course of the family offense
case later discounted his own findings in the custody case. This
paradox could not have arisen if a presumption were imposed. The
finding that a family offense was committed would have automati-
cally triggered the presumption against awarding custody to the
person against whom those findings were made. In Queens, had
the court and the expert applied the legislative findings to the facts
presented, the mother's testimony of violence would have made
sense to them. It is likely that the court would have made a finding
that the father committed acts of domestic violence, again trigger-
ing the presumption.
The Brooklyn and Queens cases share a long history of violence
perpetrated by the respective respondents.95 In both cases, the pe-
titioners had prior orders of protection from the family court. The
orders were issued either on consent of the respondents, or upon
their default. These orders were issued prior to the enactment of
the Family Protection and Domestic Violence Intervention Act of
1994,96 and the expanded relief currently available under that
law.97 In part because of the limited relief available prior to that
legislation, there was no incentive to hold a hearing. Orders were
typically issued for one year with the condition that the respondent
not commit a family offense against the petitioner. Thus, there had
never been a hearing in either case, even though several protective
orders were issued throughout the years. Quick dispositions, with-
out due deliberation, often lead to tolerance of unacceptable be-
93. Act of May 21, 1996, ch. 85, 1996 N.Y. LAWS 273, 274.
94. See id. at 273-74.
95. See supra Parts I1I.B-C.
96. Ch. 222, 1994 N.Y. LAws 2232.
97. See N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr §§ 841-842 (McKinney 1999).
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havior. The permissive posture of the courts, the police and the
community at large contributes to the continuation of intra-familial
violence.98 A hearing, on the other hand, gives weight to the issues
and holds batterers accountable for their behavior. Holding a
hearing would probably empower the victim to return to court if
the order were violated. Furthermore,- it is likely that after a hear-
ing the court may have made an order better fashioned to "provide
meaningful protection."9 9 Last, a hearing would have likely pre-
vented the extended custody trials both parties and the children
had to endure if the court had appropriately considered the domes-
tic violence when rendering its initial custody and visitation orders.
At the very least, it would have limited the time period addressed
in the course of the later trials.
A. Unintended Consequences on Child Protective Cases
Ironically, the legislative findings meant to help battered
mothers in custody disputes are used by courts and child protective
officials rely upon to pursue neglect and abuse cases against them
under Article Ten of the FCA.1°° In these child protective cases,
the Appellate Division has held that exposure to domestic violence
is harmful enough to warrant a finding of neglect, T'0 without expert
testimony. Regardless of any actions that they may have taken to
protect their children, mothers can be found guilty of neglect or
abuse under a strict liability standard, because of their "failure to
protect" their children against the harm that results from exposure
to domestic violence. Courts seem to require a greater showing of
harm in private custody matters between parents. The appellate
decision in Mrs. M.'s case illustrates this point.102
It is the child protective cases, however, where state intervention
is a factor, that ought to require a greater showing of harm. State
control routinely results in the placement of children into foster
98. See Kristian Miccio, In the Name of Mothers and Children: Deconstructing the
Myth of Passive Battered Mother and the 'Protected Child' Neglect Proceedings, 58
ALB. L. REV. 1087, 1104 (1995).
99. Leffingwell v. Leffingwell, 448 N.Y.S.2d 799 (App. Div. 1982).
100. See N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 1012(f).
101. See In re Deandre T., 676 N.Y.S.2d 666, 667 (App. Div. 1998) (holding that
expert testimony is not required to establish that children are neglected through a
pattern of domestic violence); In re Lonell J., 673 N.Y.S.2d 116, 117-18 (App. Div.
1998) (stating that proof of pattern of domestic violence by the father against the
mother and witnessed by their older child is sufficient to establish neglect absent ex-
pert testimony).
102. See Mackey v. Mackey, 696 N.Y.S.2d 695, 695 (App. Div. 1999).
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care, without offering much assistance to a battered mother. 10 3 The
standards in these two types of cases are completely different - a
finding of child neglect requires proof of impairment of a physical,
mental or emotional condition," 4 whereas custody determinations
rest on the best interests of the child. Certainly if there is neglect
then it may not be in the child's best interest for the neglectful
parent to maintain custody, but the converse is not necessarily true.
Just because it is not in the child's best interest to be in the custody
of one parent does not mean that the parent is neglectful. Appel-
late courts, however, have held that severe domestic violence be-
tween parents in the presence of the child creates imminent danger
of impairment "as a matter of common sense," and no expert testi-
mony is required to make a determination of neglect.0 5
In some private custody/visitation cases, the Appellate Division
requires a showing of a "detrimental effect" before limiting visita-
tion, as in Mrs. M's case discussed above. 106 In others, evidence of
a history of domestic violence was sufficient to support an order for
supervised visitation.10 7 The court of appeals held that "absent ex-
ceptional circumstances, such as those which would be inimical to
the welfare of the child ... appropriate provision for visitation or
other access by the noncustodial parent follows almost as a matter
of course.' 0 8 The language in the legislative history of the 1996
amendment makes it abundantly clear that domestic violence is in-
imical to the welfare of the child. Therefore, no further showing of
exceptional circumstances should be necessary. The court of ap-
peals decision in Tropea v. Tropea,0 9 rejecting a three-tiered test,
absent exceptional circumstances, in custody relocation cases, fur-
ther calls into question whether all custody/visitation issues should
be determined by the best interest standard.
103. See, e.g., V. Pualani Enos, Prosecuting Battered Mothers: State Laws' Failure to
Protect Battered Women and Abused Children, 19 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 229, 249
(1996).
104. See N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 1012(f).
105. In re Athena M., 678 N.Y.S.2d 11, 12 (App. Div. 1998); see also Deandre T.,
676 N.Y.S.2d at 666; Lonell J., 673 N.Y.S.2d at 116.
106. See Mackey, 696 N.Y.S.2d at 695; see also Thaxton v. Morro, 635 N.Y.S.2d 796,
798 (App. Div. 1995) ("[W]hile denial of visitation to a noncustodial parent is a dras-
tic remedy, it will be ordered where there exist compelling reasons and substantial
evidence showing that such visitation is detrimental to the children."); Janousek v.
Janousek, 485 N.Y.S.2d 305, 308 (App. Div. 1985).
107. See Hugo T. v. Jeannine F., 671 N.Y.S.2d 259 (App. Div. 1998); In re Dejesus,
1999 WL 1215165 (N.Y. App. Div. Nov. 1, 1999).
108. Weiss v. Weiss, 418 N.E.2d 377, 380 (N.Y. 1981).
109. 665 N.E.2d 145 (N.Y. 1996).
2000] DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN CUSTODY CASES 901
Courts have held that expert testimony is necessary to determine
the degree to which a child has been affected by domestic violence,
the prospect of emotional harm to the child if visitation were
granted or denied and the extent to which the abuse is indicative of
a general psychological problem which may pose a risk to the
child.110 This rationale is inconsistent with appellate case law that
holds domestic violence constitutes neglect, without the necessity
of expert testimony."1 Nor does it provide a rationale for the rul-
ing in the third case where there was expert testimony as to both
the general harm resulting from exposure to domestic violence and
the extent to which the individual child was affected by witnessing
the assault on her mother. In that case, the Appellate Division did
not explicitly hold that expert testimony was insufficient to estab-
lish a detrimental effect, it held that the visitation decision was
within the sound discretion of the family court and would "not be
set aside unless it lack[ed] a substantial basis in the record. ''"12
Although the child protective cases hold that expert testimony is
not necessary to prove that exposure to domestic violence consti-
tutes harm, 13 no appellate court has yet to hold that acts of domes-
tic violence between parents, even in the presence of the child, are
sufficient as a matter of law to support a finding of neglect. In each
of the appellate cases finding neglect, evidence was introduced
showing actual impairment to the child's emotional condition as a
result of the domestic violence. 14
The imposition of a presumption against awarding custody to an
abusive parent would make the law more consistent with the child
protective rationale set forth in the recent appellate cases, how-
ever, the child protective cases also need to be reexamined. The
answer is not simply that expert testimony should be required in
child protective cases, but that the strict liability standard should be
replaced with a reasonable person standard that takes into account
a battered mother's particular situation." 5 Otherwise, there is no
distinction between the victim and the abuser; both are viewed as
equally liable. The unique circumstances facing battered women
must be considered in child protective cases just as they must be in
110. See ELKINS & FOSBINDER, supra note 6, at 613.
111. See Athena M., 678 N.Y.S.2d at 11; Deandre T., 676 N.Y.S.2d at 666; Lonell J.,
673 N.Y.S.2d at 116.
112. See Mackey, 696 N.Y.S.2d at 695.
113. See Athena M., 678 N.Y.S.2d at 11; Deandre T., 676 N.Y.S.2d at 666; Lonell J.,
673 N.Y.S.2d at 116.
114. See ELKINS & FOSBINDER, supra note 6, at 78 (Supp. Mar. 1999).
115. See Miccio, supra note 98, at 1097; Enos, supra note 103, at 229.
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custody cases. Battered mothers are not passive; rather, they en-
gage in strategic, logical behavior as they attempt to stop the vio-
lence or leave. The major variable, however, the violent man, is
outside their realm of control. Staying in the home, especially
given the lack of resources and social supports for leaving, should
never be read as accepting violence.116 The battered mother knows
far too well that violence does not end upon separation, but tends
to escalate.1 17
The 1996 amendment does not distinguish between custody and
visitation. In most domestic violence cases, visitation should be su-
pervised until the non-custodial parent can show he has completed
a treatment program." 8
The studies showing a high correlation between spouse and child
abuse should not surprise those familiar with Article Ten of the
FCA that provides for derivative findings on siblings in neglect
cases.119 The rationale for derivative findings is that, if one child is
being abused, it is likely the other children are also being abused,
or may be soon. The burden is on the parent to show the circum-
stances giving rise to the findings of abuse against one child no
longer exist as to the other child.' 20 It is not a far leap to find that
if a man is abusing his wife then he is also likely to abuse his chil-
dren. Like the burden in the derivative neglect cases, the burden
in custody cases should shift to the abusive parent to show that he
has taken steps to remedy the condition and is no longer a threat to
the physical or emotional well-being of the child.
B. Parent Education Programs
Parent education programs are designed to educate litigants
about the effect of custody litigation on their children. The goal is
to inform parents about the problems associated with divorce or
separation and "encourage[s] parents to assume responsibility for
creating a post-divorce environment in which their children are
their first priority."'121 These programs stress the positive influence
of co-parenting where children can enjoy a supportive relationship
with both parents. Research shows this is often true in non-violent
116. See SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE (1982).
117. See Act of May 21, 1996, ch. 85, 1996 N.Y. LAws 273.
118. See AMERICAN PSYCHOL. Assoc., supra note 58, at 99.
119. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1046(a)(i) (McKinney 1999).
120. See In re B.B.M., N.Y. L.J., Feb. 16, 1999, at 25 (Fam. Ct. Feb. 16, 1999).
121. PEACE (PARENT EDUCATION AND CUSTODY EFFECTIVENESS) PROGRAM
AND CURRICULUM MANUAL 1 (1995).
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families.122 The imposition of parent education programs is an im-
portant approach for the non-battered population.
But the research on children of divorce and on children exposed
to domestic violence developed as two separate branches, leading
to conflicting advice for battered women.123 Where domestic vio-
lence is present, a co-parenting relationship and the impact of con-
flict often represents a negative influence on children. 124 Referring
battered women to parent education programs places them in a
situation where they are advised to promote a relationship and set
aside their past conflicts with a spouse who may be a danger to
themselves and their children. Battered mothers and children
share the same interest: Safety first. Many times it is the safety of
their children that prompts battered women to seek judicial redress
in the first place. "Children are a central focus in decisions bat-
tered women make about leaving the batterer or staying in the
abusive relationship.' 1 25 The best way to protect children is by as-
sisting mothers in safety planning and holding offenders accounta-
ble for their behavior.
Suggesting to the battered woman that it may be best to share
custody or allow unsupervised visitation in an effort to maintain an
amiable relationship with her abuser for the sake of the child, can
be very dangerous. It takes an enormous amount of courage for a
battered woman to seek court intervention. Questioning her deci-
sion by referring her to a program which tends to emphasize coop-
eration with her batterer is counterproductive. The woman may
start to believe that her batterer really should have unsupervised
visitation, or even custody, as illustrated by the case of Mrs. J. and
her children when she relinquished custody to her abusive hus-
band, thinking this would prevent him from stalking her.126 She
may begin to believe that since the children really want to visit him,
as Mrs. M.'s young child wanted to visit Mr. M, that she ought to
withdraw her request for supervised visitation.1 27 A battered
mother may begin to believe that maybe the judge is right; after all,
he referred her to the parent education program, and he is the au-
thority figure. Society would never condone referring a rape victim
to a program that sends her the message that she ought to cooper-
122. See JAFFE & GEFFNER, supra note 85, at 378.
123. See id. at 378.
124. See id.
125. Id. at 377.
126. See supra Part III.B.
127. See supra Part III.C.
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ate with her assailant. Referrals to these programs are a poor sub-
stitute for judicial action. When the court fails to intervene it
deepens a battered woman's sense of isolation and can be even
more psychologically damaging. "The court's desire to smooth
things over acts further to victimize the battered woman.''128
Cases where domestic violence is an issue must be screened out
- whether the violence occurred in the past, or is ongoing. Again,
violence does not end upon separation; it tends to escalate. 12 9 If
referrals are to be made at all, they must be made on the consent of
the parties, and litigants who decline to attend should not be penal-
ized. Referrals to these programs ought to be made after the ap-
pointment of counsel so that the individual interests of the parties
will be represented. As a seasoned attorney, I feel pressured when
asked to consent to my client's attendance at a program. It must
be almost impossible for a litigant to feel she has the option of not
attending.
C. Specialized Domestic Violence Parts
Other changes in the New York City family courts will also ad-
vance the concerns of the new law, and the way domestic violence
is handled in general. Chief Judge Judith Kaye has brought a new
awareness to the issues facing victims by creating specialized do-
mestic violence parts in each New York City family court.13 °
Although judges assigned to these parts have no special training,
the specialized parts raise the consciousness of those participating
in the system to the unique problems presented by domestic vio-
lence.131 In some boroughs, the judges who sit in the specialized
domestic violence parts meet regularly with advocates, court offi-
cials, district attorneys and judges from the criminal court domestic
violence parts thereby promoting communication and coordina-
tion.13 2 One of the greatest needs for families experiencing vio-
lence is coordinated services. 133
128. Zorza, supra note 59, at 1120 (citing PETER JAFFE ET. AL., CHILDREN OF BAT-
TERED) WOMEN 108 (1990)).
129. See Act of May 21, 1996, ch. 85, 1996 N.Y. LAWS 273.
130. See Editorial, Kaye Puts Order in the Court, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, July 19, 1998,
at 48.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See JAFFE & GEFFNER, supra note 85, at 394.
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V. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL
Under the law, judges who do not understand the nature and
effects of domestic violence on children and their mothers are left
too much discretion."' The Legislature was unable to create the
social change it desired because it failed to use language lawyers
and judges understand. In order to overcome entrenched attitudes,
legal reform must be clear. The Appellate Division also has not
clearly defined exactly what constitutes "weighty consideration.' 135
Only by implementing the language of a legal presumption can leg-
islation alter individual behavior. 136
Many advocates, myself included, fear the backlash a presump-
tion might create; batterers know far too well how to manipulate
the legal system to gain further control over their victims. 137 A
presumption statute must include additional language to protect
victims of domestic violence. Permitting rebuttal of the presump-
tion through evidence of a history of abuse by the other party is a
necessary start. Although there will be cases in which the pre-
sumption is used against a victim of domestic violence, it is likely
that the numbers of victims and their children who will benefit
from the protection is far greater than the number of batterers who
will succeed in manipulating the system.
The new law, although helpful, has had little impact on the way
family court judges determine custody cases in which domestic vio-
lence is an issue. 138 Although the Legislature specifically rejected a
rebuttable presumption against granting custody to a parent found
to have committed acts of domestic violence, it is apparent that a
presumption is necessary in order to meet the goals advanced by
the Legislature. 39 In addition to the proof by example afforded by
the three cases presented in Part III, the National Council of Juve-
nile and Family Court Judges, 140 along with the American Bar As-
134. See Kurtz, supra note 14, at 1359.
135. See supra notes 34-50 and accompanying text.
136. See David Zlotnick, Empowering the Battered Woman: The Use of Criminal
Contempt Sanctions to Enforce Civil Protection Orders, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1153, 1154
(1995) (discussing Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law,
Language and Family Violence, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1665 (1990)).
137. See Zorza, supra note 59, at 1120.
138. See discussion supra Part III.
139. See Kurtz, supra note 14, at 1365-66; Catherine F. Klein & Leslye Orlofff, Pro-
viding Legal Protection for Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case
Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 954-59 (1993).
140. See MODEL CODE ON DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE § 401 (1994) (pro-
viding that in custody suits there is a rebuttable presumption that it is not in the best
interest of the child to be in custody of the perpetrator of family violence).
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sociation 41 and the United States Congress 142 all support a
statutory presumption against awarding custody to an abusive
parent.
CONCLUSION
Many new laws and policies are emerging in the area of domestic
violence. In 1994, the Legislature passed the Family Protection and
Domestic Violence Intervention Act - a complete overhaul of
laws dealing with domestic violence in both the civil and criminal
arena. 43 The Legislature declared that domestic violence is now a
crime. 144 It is unfortunate that batterers are not always considered
criminals when they seek custody of their children. If convicted of
a stranger crime, courts are known to accord weight to the bat-
terer's criminal history. 145 When the victim is the child's mother, it
seems to be another story.
All the new reform in the arena of domestic violence addresses
the difference between domestic violence and most other assaultive
behavior - in the former, the victim and perpetrator have or had
an intimate relationship. Custody determinations do not seem to
account for this unique aspect. The framework in which custody
decisions are made is still the same regardless of the 1996 legisla-
tion. Women are expected to cooperate with their batterers for the
sake of the child. Attempts at protection can be seen as interfering
with access, and interfering with access may result in an award of
custody to the abusive parent. 146
141. See Howard Davidson, The Impact of Domestic Violence on Children: A Re-
port to the President of A.B.A., 1 (1994).
142. See H.R. Con. Res. 172, 101st Cong. (1990).
143. Family Protection and Domestic Violence Intervention Act of 1994, Ch. 222,
1994 N.Y. LAws 2704 (granting concurrent jurisdiction between the family and crimi-
nal courts, providing for mandatory arrest, notice to victims, establishes technological
advances and training for courts and law enforcement personnel).
144. See id.
145. See Hyde v. Hudor, No. 84077, 1999 WL 971927, at *2 (N.Y. App. Div. Oct.
28, 1999) (weighing respondent's plea of guilty to assault in the third degree and re-
sisting arrest along with other factors in award of custody to petitioner); In re Nicole
F., 634 N.Y.S.2d 78, 79 (App. Div. 1995) ("In view of respondent's long and violent
criminal history, including at least three felony convictions for assault, none of which
had been disclosed or discovered prior to the agreement of the parties to release the
two-year-old child to his custody ... Family Court erred in granting respondent un-
supervised visitation."). But see Ronald F. v. Lawrence G., 694 N.Y.S.2d 622, 627
(Fam. Ct. 1999) (awarding custody where "[t]here is absolutely no evidence in this
record which indicates that the petitioner's past criminal history has had an adverse
effect upon the children").
146. See ELKINS & FOSBINDER, supra note 6, at 617; Daghir v. Daghir, 441 N.Y.S.2d
494 (App. Div. 1981).
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The New York law on custody is helpful to children who are ex-
posed to domestic violence, but the negative impact on children
must be given more weight when determining custody and visita-
tion. The legislative mandate to give domestic violence "weighty
consideration" is not enough to overcome entrenched attitudes
about domestic violence. The language of the statute should be
changed to a create a presumption against awarding custody to
abusive parents so that judges, lawyers, social workers and psychol-
ogists will change their behavior accordingly.
E
